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## POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS | RESEARCH ARTICLE

# Gender stereotypes and patronage practices in women's careers: A study of the Mexican executive branch

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**Abstract:** Feminist institutionalism seeks to include women as actors and to understand the interplay between gender and the functioning of political institutions. Elite theory looks to understand social interaction that an establishment can effectively dictate by virtue of their control over the resources and organisations. Framed theoretically by these conjoint ideas, this paper studies how gender stereotypes affect women's political careers. The aim is to understand how informal institutions in combination with social gendered stereotypes produce and reproduce patriarchal political systems, including gendered elite power relations. The study of elites has reinforced the idea of the existence of a ruling class composed of a ruling elite and sub-elites. In this arrangement, where dominant groups are characterised by the accumulation of power in the sense of having the ability and resources needed to control decisions, rules and behaviours are producing and reproducing the necessary conditions for elites to work, organise and exist. Thus, institutions are structuring political life. Among these informal institutions, different practices have been set to advance a political career. Patronage as the support and privilege an organisation or individual bestows to another, has work within the Mexican political system as a key element responsible for social order. Working in parallel, gendered stereotypes

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### PUBLIC INTEREST STATEMENT

Gender parity has been recently approved in Mexico, in 2014, for all legislative positions. However, only three women hold cabinet positions in the executive branch. More importantly, there has never been a woman in the Secretaría de Gobernación-equivalent to the Interior Ministry in other countries, nor in Finance or Defence, among others. Women in the executive cabinet often hold portfolios such as Education, Foreign Affairs, and Health. Yet, the representation of women in the Mexican executive branch is seldom a research topic. The purpose is to understand how rules in combination with gendered stereotypes produce male domination including gendered power relations. The objective is to analyse the mechanisms affecting the advancement of women's political careers within the Mexican Executive branch.

continue influencing expectations about behaviours. Through semi-structured interviews, conducted between September 2013 and August 2015, this paper sustains that one of the major constraints to the advancement of women's political careers in the Mexican executive branch lies in the elite's employment of a patronage system that is based on social arrangements distorted by gender stereotypes. The objective is to understand the mechanisms affecting the advancement of women's political careers within the Mexican executive branch.

**Subjects:** Latin American Politics; Executive Politics; Political Institutions; Political Leaders; Gender Studies - Soc Sci

**Keywords:** gendered stereotypes; elite behaviour; patronage; women's presence; Mexican politics

### 1. Introduction

In general, political representation of women in the Mexican executive branch is seldom a research topic. Most studies focus on analysing the access of women in the legislature and the use of gender quotas for facilitating this (Baldez, 2004, 2006; Cornelius, Eisenstadt, & Hindley, 1999; Lijphart, 1984; Norris & Lovenduski, 2010). In the case of the executive branch, senior appointments depend, at least in the Mexican case, on the President and other high ranking members of the cabinet (Article 89, paragraph two). This places the executive branch in a different institutional analytic space. In the case of the legislative branch, analysis of electoral systems and gender quotas are essential, studies of the executive branch should focus more on informal practices surrounding the recruitment process.

This article seeks to generate contributions related to the understanding of institutions, structures and career opportunities in executive positions at the federal level. Thus, it attempts to fill a gap in the research. The objective is to identify the barriers women are facing to advance their careers. With a focus on the paths to power and on the conditions that favour or hinder the participation of women, the political participation of this group may become clearer.

A significant part of the contributions are based on findings from interviews with women placed in high-ranking positions in the Mexican executive. The semi-structured interviews were conducted with six-teen women including Secretaries and Undersecretaries between September 2013 and August 2015 (see Appendix 1), taking into account gender as a desirable condition of the people interviewed. In order to have full and detailed recounts, the names of the interviewees cannot be mentioned, since confidentiality was always a condition. Thus, interviewees are identified with a number. The interview method was used to establish "patterns or issues between private respondents" (Warren, 2002, p. 85). Because studies of informal politics and camaraderie require in depth examining of sexist practices, interviews were considered the most appropriate approach. It is noteworthy that the interviewees were selected for their knowledge as "key informants" in building policies but also as well established participants of executive branch politics (Warren, 2002, p. 87). The first interviews produced other contacts, following a snowball process.

The semi-structured interviews were employed to play a number of issues and allow the inclusion of experiences raised by the respondents. The questions did not focus specifically on gender issues. Interviews were built thematically. The first section focused on the beginning of their political careers, giving space for personal thoughts on how each person became involved in politics. The second part was related to professional and personal experiences of discrimination from other members of the executive. Finally, the third section was engrossed by respondents observations on the patronage system and stereotypes, and how they have been affected.

The article focuses on institutions, structures and career opportunities women are confronted with when working within the Mexican executive branch. Attention is given to the paths to power and on the conditions that favour or hinder the participation of women. For this, the article first questions who makes up the Mexican political elite and what are its characteristics. Arguing through elite theory and Camp (1983) and Smith's (1979) seminal work, it describes a deep-seated group that has change little over the past decades. This is followed by a discussion of institutionalised practices that have been altered by gender bias conceptions. Thus, as argued, gender becomes central in understanding formal and informal institutions within the executive branch. For this, the article brings into feminist institutionalism.

In order to provide a much richer context, the discussion is followed by the description and analysis of women's representation within the Mexican executive branch. After this, the remaining of the article is focused on the key central arguments: institutionalized gender stereotypes, based upon the relevance of a "female identity" and patronage practices experienced by everyone, but based on the concept and need of political capital. At this point, the central argument suggests that the mixture or co-dependence of political capital with the existent entrenched gender stereotypes is limiting women because the participants are subject to clientelist and political patronage.

## 2. Constructing and defining political elites in Mexico

Research and analysis has been undertaken around the idea of elites, its composition, and even the networks and practices these groups have (Camp, 2006; Loaeza, 2001; Mosca, 2011; Pareto, 1991). Studies have tried to analyse the concept of leaderships among groups, including research on parliaments, parties, or bureaucracies. Furthermore, they have looked into signs or possible clues that allow to conclude elites are concentrated into a single entity. The concept of elites, in that sense, is continuously changing. But even if general conclusions are scarce, what studies of elites have in common is that they have attempted to theorise about the nature of control and the role of leadership in society. These have suggested that small groups of people are controlling a disproportionate amount of resources, sometimes wealth or/and political power. Elite theory, thus, is concerned with concepts embedded in political science and political theory. The objective of this study is not to discuss any of the existing and sometimes even prescriptive theories of elites produced in the past. The main goal is to argue, through elite studies and the understanding of the existence of privileged groups with specific characteristics (as is education, wealth and even embedded networks) that gender stereotypes have to be considered as elements for the composition and characterisation of these groups. Arguably, elite theory should realise the importance of gender relations to the configuration of elite groups.

The theory needs to be prompted to incorporate and analyse gendered relations and practices in the characterisation and understanding of elite groups. For example, "elite theory has enquire about the techniques of leadership, the relations between leaders and led and what sorts of people attained positions of leadership" (Parry, 2005, p. 19). In these research, gender has not played a central role, neither the characteristics by which leaders are identified and separated from those following. Thus, this article questions how leadership is masculinised and how political careers are controlled by a patronage and clientelist male dominated system.

Power elites even if not identified with one set of particular characteristics, are present in several associations and institutions. Wright Mills defines the concept, referring to the US in the mid nineteen-fifties. "By power elite, we refer to those political, economic, and military circles which as an intricate set of overlapping cliques share decisions having at least national consequences. In so far as national events are decided, the power elite are those who decide them" (1999, p. 18). It was the linkages between the political, economic, and military hierarchies that provided the basis for unified action, and the consequent existence of a monolithic elite. "These linkages took three fundamental forms. One was common social background ... a second linkage grew out of institutional

connections, as men moves smoothly from one circle to another, articulating common positions of interest and creating complex webs of interlocking directorates. Third, particularly in times of crisis, component segments of the power elite engaged in explicit coordination of various sorts” (Smith, 1979, p. 195).

As for Mexico, in most of its history, the country has been ruled by elites (Camp, 1983, 2006; Loeza, 2001). Minority groups have been those who have exercised a monopoly on political, economic and cultural resources. They have also exerted a disproportionate influence on the process of government decision-making, and even in the creation and transmission of dominant ideas and values in society. In his compelling study of political elites and recruitment in Mexico, Peter Smith analyzes the structure and the transformation of the national political elite in twentieth-century Mexico.<sup>1</sup> In this study, he suggests that by the turn of the century, the distribution of high office was an accomplished fact. “Those who had positions by and large retained them. Repetition was the order of the day, and it was in this sense that the possession of one office determined what the next one would be ... The system was static, rigid, and closed” (1979, p. 185).

However, the transformations that began with the Revolution of 1910 had significant impacts upon the configuration of these elites. In his characterisation of political elites after the Revolution, Smith sustained that “repetition was greatly reduced, though by no means eliminated. Careers acquired flexibility, and people moved rapidly around the interpositional checkerboard” (1979, p. 156). In the nineteen-seventies the system gained some stability because of subsequent institutionalisation. This tutelary system, as Smith calls it, “tightened the social requirements for admission to the ruling class. Higher education and a professional occupation have almost become a sine qua non for access to the elite” (Smith, 1979, p. 185). Both Smith and Camp have concluded that the most important features of these groups include place of birth, education level (specifically careers such as medicine, law, engineering and economics) and the socio-economic background of their parents, or as Mosca calls them, advantages of position (2011).

As a matter of fact, and with the exception of age or the incidence of military officers, the post-revolutionary elites bore a substantial resemblance to the pre-revolutionary group. In both periods, elites were born and raised in predominantly urban areas and within middle-class environments. Though less in the pre-revolutionary group, elites in both cases were educated at universities, and even held professional occupations, mainly in law and (more recently) economics. Mexican political elites, as research has found, have been composed through time, by the middle class. Although studies and the indicators employed were sometimes rather imprecise, they point towards the same conclusion: “The middle class, it self a privileged stratum, has constantly dominated the upper reaches of political power in Mexico, and, if anything, its hegemony has been increasing over time.” (Smith, 1979, p. 101). The consolidation of Mexico’s political system in the nineteen-seventies and nineteen-eighties involved a highly centralised government. This essentially became a trait marking aspects of political recruitment. For example, the National University (UNAM) “became a prime training ground for aspiring *politicos*” (Smith, 1979, p. 103). Urban areas became centres for political networking, and Mexico City recaptured the control of the system.

In speaking of the elite, this research intends to refer to those holding power. This surely brings up to light several problems, like how much power is decisive? Or, how much power can make decisions have national consequences? Thus, which members of society hold this kind of power? In an attempt to formulate a definition that could allow the study of the Mexican executive branch, but mainly based on previous studies that have analysed Mexican political elite, such as Smith (1973) and Camp (1986, 2006), national political elites include those who have held public office of national importance, including ambassadors (particularly prestigious points), deputies, senators, governors, directors of the main agencies and state-own companies, sub-cabinet members, and members of the presidential cabinet. As elite theory has suggested, these have created a network of contacts that have largely granted them complete access and control, and in the case of government, continuity of permanence. From elite theory then, this article sustains that these largely informal contacts,

primarily family connections that may vary depending on the institution where elites are embedded, are maintained largely in an informal manner, becoming capable of exploiting their positions so as to preserve the elite's domination and patriarchal status.

An implication of the above arguments may be that elite constitutes a coherent, united and self-conscious group, "the unity of the elite is sometimes seen as the outcome of the elite's social background and sometimes the product of the very organization of the elite itself" (Parry, 2005, p. 29). This article does not seek to argue that Mexican elites are coherent and act in a coordinated manner. However, it is possible to contend that gender cuts across categories that determine who is part of an elite. Gender affects specific roles of members belonging to these groups.

Elite theory has argued that wealth and education tend to maintain the elite's domination. These advantages of position, as Mosca sustained (2011), serve to increase the distance between the elite and other groups. Emphasis is in Mexican politics where exclusiveness of the elite and the difficulty of obtaining entry are also related to gender. The strength of the elite within the Mexican executive branch has been sustained through several generations because of its ability to lay down the rules, the institutions, both formal and informal, not only for admission but also for further advancement. As Smith suggests, "conflict has been institutionalised, controlled and centralised" (1979, p. 379). Part of this institutionalisation, as it is argued in this research, involves gender becoming part and cutting across other standards, such as wealth, social background, education, and ideology. Elites characteristics then, become the outcome of intersecting patterns of gender, race, education, economic status, age, among others. Intersectionality thus, denotes the interaction between multiple dimensions of experiences and even, of discrimination. The characterisation of elites becomes a process of intersectionalities. It is not enough just to be educated, or have family connections or economic resources. It is in the combination of factors that the identity profile of Mexican elites lies.

This does not deny the possibility of change. Elite's survival may depend even on its capacity to adapt, thus to admit elements that do not comply with the initial standard. Gender is a feature, which like the others, is possible to ignore or set aside. However, continuity may be enhanced by gender, since roles or as Weber contended, "style of life" distinguishing one group from others, is affected by it (Weber, 2009). As argued along the article, elites' continuity is also enhanced by gendered stereotypes, in which women and men's roles take precedent when political support, responsibilities and recruitment support are given.

Even if no variable referring to social origin determines to a significant degree the conquest of the highest political office (i.e. cabinet positions), education, social origin, and occupation, as stressed by Camp and Smith, have played a decisive role in creating pathways for accessing the national political elite. These above mentioned characteristics resulted on a profile that continues to exist, controlling to an extent the recruitment process. Among these, gender constitutes a key element. What it is argued then, is that other aspects of elite's identity are significantly influenced by the beliefs and experiences of gender. Exploring the dimension of gender within Mexican elite theory behaviour and practices allows to understand more deeply the situations women are facing in advancing their political careers. As Collin stress, gender must be understood in the context of power relations embedded in social identities (1990, 2000).

Studying elite features and realizing the significance of intersectionality in rooting elites through recruitment becomes even more relevant when proceedings to attain positions in government are in the hands of few and do not involve citizenry participation through elections. Overall, government positions can be classified into three categories. First, those members of the political elite who have access to public office because of an election process, such as the President, Governors, Senators and Deputies. Second, members of the ruling class that are directly or indirectly appointed by the executive, including the Secretaries of State, Heads of federal agencies, decentralised and public companies. Third, the high-level officials whose appointment by the President requires Senate approval, like Judges of the Supreme Court. Although it is recognised that in all cases, agencies or

bodies of selection generate direct effects on the profile of the elected candidates (Vidal Correa, 2013), categories two and three required direct appointment and specifically, the second is the focus of this research.

The argument presented here on the characterisation of a group of members of the Mexican political elite is not an absolute one. Neither does it look to provide an assessment on their performance. The term elite is employed then, without the implication that those within are necessarily the most able members of the group. Any account of the nature of the *establishment* and the exact measurement of its influence on Mexican politics is still more difficult. But what may be confirmed through the interviews is that many of its members are men with influence steaming from their positions. What is contended then, is the existence of a system of ideas, in which distinctions between men and women based on gender subsists and sometimes overlaps with the interest of the elite. The organisation of the system is based on masculine perceptions of political institutions, which helps reinforce the elite's dominance. In estimating the influence of the political leadership, it becomes also necessary to take into account the political institutions themselves. This is where institutionalism, specifically feminist institutionalism becomes necessary.

### 3. Institutions and gender: Recognising that rules do not operate in a social vacuum

The exclusion of gender as part of the considerations taken into account when studying institutions may lead to omission or ignorance and misunderstanding of crucial ideas, interest, rules and processes. "Feminist institutionalism recognizes that political explanation is about ideas, interests, and institutions, which are intertwined" (Lovenduski, 2011, p. ix). It is about the common idea that institutions are working in a gendered manner. Institutions are the rules that structure political and social life. These configurations can be expressed as the "formal rules, compliance procedures and standard operating practices that structure relationships between individuals in various units of the polity and the economy" (Hall, 1986, pp. 19–20). But these rules do not operate in a social vacuum. They take meaning through the actions of individual organisations including government, parliaments, and political parties (March & Olsen, 1989, p. 107).

To say feminist institutionalism is one coherent group of ideas is to ignore the different approaches within institutionalism itself. From feminist sociological institutionalism that identifies the social norms, looking into their gendered effects to feminist discursive institutionalism that is focused on ideas about masculinity and femininity, common ground may be found. "They all see institutions as rules that structure behaviour" (Steinmo, 2008, p. 126). In this case, the article contends that institutions structure behaviour so that the political elites in the Mexican executive continue to prevail, with standards that are reinforced by the masculinisation of those same institutions they control. Thus, this article questions how the gendered informal rules help continuing the masculinisation of the executive political elites. State institutions vary significantly. However, a commonality found is that these "are historically the products of the 'mobilization of masculine bias'" (Burton, 1991, p. 14) helping to both produce and reproduce patriarchal power relations (Eisenstein, 1991; Ferree, 1995; Sawer, 1990).

This article is focus on the employment of informal institutions by elite members within the executive branch with the intention of advancing political careers. Institutions can be understood as rules and procedures that structure social interaction, constraining and/or enabling certain actions or behaviours. Even if such agreement can be made, there are significant divisions as to how institutions may be classified as formal and informal. Some authors have focused on informal institutions as part of what they call culture (Pejovich, 2006) while others have characterised state agencies and state rules as formal institutions and norms enforcing civil society forms, such as religious, kinship and others, as informal institutions (Boussard, 2000; Manor, 2001). But these conceptualisations fail to account for the fact that both the state and individuals may produce, reproduce and enforced this type of rules, and also, that these may be share by both state and social organisations. Thus, informal institutions are, as Helmke and Levistky sustained in their study of informal institutions in Latin America (2004), socially shared. Following this and for the purpose of this study, informal institutions

are understood as rules unusually written, created, reproduced, share and enforced outside what may be considered sanctioned channels. Informal institutions are to be understood as the practices, stereotypes and norms that shape formal institutions, and that in some instances may even contradict or weaken formal rules (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004).

This approach implicitly recognises the impact that gender has had in political institutions and practices, such as internal procedures and cultures. These work as constraints on the ability female members may have when acting within the executive branch. The same has been studied and found within parliamentary proceedings, looking into the significant impacts informal practices have on the representation of women (Carroll, 1984; Carroll & Jenkins, 2001; Childs, 2004; Dodson, 2006; Franceschet, 2005). As it is sustained throughout this article, in the Mexican executive, it is the combination of patronage and clientelism with patriarchal figures leading all decision-making groups that masculine political dominance is reasserted.

The logic followed is that informal institutions not only facilitate entry but also have become the way forward for all who wish to advance their careers in the Mexican executive. Thus, the informal rules include, among others, party loyalty, the expectation of twenty-four hours availability, sponsors and membership to political groups where links or networks that allow these elites to remain in power are formed. Cutting across such informal rules is gender. Therefore, it is recognised that institutions are gendered, meaning “that constructions of masculinity and femininity are intertwined in the daily culture or “logic” of political institutions, rather than existing out in society or fixed within individuals which they then bring whole to the institution” (Kenney, 1996, p. 456).

Embedded in gendered institutions, elite groups display behaviour according to the institutional structures that surround them. These gendered patterns of hierarchy and exclusion, as Acker labels them (Acker, 1992, p. 568), are what ten of the interviewees described as mandatory ranks, means for the distribution of responsibilities, and pork barrel practices. The latter understood as public money that elected members or other public officials have available to finance projects of local interest, often used to win votes. These include discretionary public funds transferred to be spent on infrastructure, electrification, street pavement, and other state provided services. These as argued later on, interconnect patronage and stereotypes, promoting then institutionalised gender discrimination.

Feminist institutionalism allows the recognition of gendered formal and informal practices. Furthermore, through its lens, it is argued that these institutions shape and constrain gendered political behaviour of elite groups, which are themselves constituted by these embodied social practices of “doing gender” on daily basis (Krook & Mackay, 2011, p. 7). Thus, gender needs to be integrated to the study and understanding of both institutions and elites. These gendered interactions take place within a framework of formal and informal rules and practices which, as Krook and Mackay sustained, “shape and structured masculine gender norms producing structural barriers which can have differential effects on both men and women as institutional actors” (2015, p. 24).

Some previous studies on women in the executive branch have focused on analysing politics within developed countries, paying attention to characteristics of the work conducted once in office (Dolan, 2008; Franceschet, 2006). For example, Julie Dolan says that the two issues more commonly studied include: whether female representation leads to greater capacity for policy response to female citizenship, and secondly, what are the opportunities professional women have compared to men in the public sector (2008, p. 90). While it is necessary to study those actions and processes, it is also essential to analyse circumstances that could be limiting the presence and the advancement of women in this branch. This could be even more significant in developing countries with recent transitions towards democratic regimes. Thus, turning to elite theory and feminist institutionalism helps bringing together two close ideas. On the one hand, that it is men who mostly dominate elite political groups. On the other, that patriarchal informal rules and practices allow male dominated elites to work and even survive. As North suggests, “informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct are much more impervious to deliberate policies” (1990, p. 6).

#### 4. Setting up the story: Women in the executive branch

Women in Mexico have witness significant advances in the protection of their right to be voted. In the last four-teen years, a number of bills were approved, leading to the final law reform setting parity for the nomination of women in the Legislative branch. At the same time, women's representation in Congress has increased significantly. For example, the proportion of seats held by women in Mexico's Chamber of Deputies has increased from 19% in 1990 to 42% in 2015 (World Bank, 2016). Even more, according to the Inter-parliamentary union, women accounted for 15.6% of the seat in the Senate in 2003, and 33.6% in 2015 (Women Interparliamentary Union [WIP], n.d., 2016). However, despite the advances in the legislative, women in the executive branch and in municipal governments have remained untouched by the parity movement. A UNDP report confirms that of the 2,440 municipalities and 16 delegations in the country, only 156 are headed by a woman, representing 6.8% (Mujeres, 2012). The positions held by women in the Mexican executive branch during the administration of President Enrique Peña Nieto (2012–2018) are not very far from the picture seen in other countries. Only four women have run for the presidency in Mexico thus far: Marcela Lombardo, Rosario Ibarra de Piedra, Cecilia Soto and Josefina Vazquez Mota. None of them but the latter, won a significant percentage of the vote. However, their presence was important, particularly the candidacies of Cecilia Soto and Josefina Vazquez Mota. The latter, even as third place in the ballots with 25 and 4% of the votes, received considerable media attention and demonstrated that women could made a credible run for the highest office.

As far as women in the executive branch with high level positions, between 1952 and 1981, no women was appointed to the executive cabinet (INEGI, 2010). From 1981, and up to 1992, only three women were appointed. As undersecretaries, between 1952 and 1992, 353 men and twelve women served the President. Women represented only 3% of all appointees in forty years (INEGI, 2010). As Rodriguez recounts in her book *Women in Contemporary Mexican Politics*, "The first women undersecretary (*subsecretaria*) was appointed in 1958 to the Ministry of Public Education ... and a women was first appointed to head a ministry (tourism) in 1981" (Rodríguez, 2003, p. 149). Women in the Executive cabinet often hold portfolios such as Education, Foreign Affairs, Health, and Programming and Budget. There has never been a woman in the *Secretaría de Gobernación*-equivalent to the Interior Ministry in other countries, nor in Finance or Defence, among others.

Mid-level positions represent the area where more women can be found, almost 90% are Heads of Department, Deputy Directors and Area Directors (in Spanish: *Jefaturas de Departamento, Subdirectorías de Área & Directorías de Área*). As Undersecretary 11 recalls:

It is evident that each time and the more one grows in the ranks fewer women are seen ... for me at meetings there are twenty men or thirty and I'm the only woman in the room ... that does not cause me problems because I have grown with both men and women, but just because it does not cause me difficulties dealing with men that does not mean I do not see it, that I do not know I am the only woman in the room ... (Undersecretary 11. Mexico City, Mexico. 8 July, 2014)

Differences in the gender composition of some hierarchies are minimal (i.e. at the lower ranks). However, in some high level positions differences are remarkable. Thus, it becomes necessary to question why women are not in senior positions as men. In all interviewees clear characteristics of elite groups were identify, like education or family connections. Women in senior positions already hold elite desirable characteristics and some features of political elites that have become decisive factors. These features may help to understand how or why someone has gotten into politics. However, they do not completely explain how some politicians had advanced their political careers more than others; why men advanced further than women? The following section attempts, based on interviews, to analyse gendered roles and the aspects brought by interviewees that are seen as relevant elements, including institutionalised stereotypes hindering their advancement and patronage systems working to promote only some women.

## 5. Institutionalised gendered stereotypes

The most important distinction highlighted within literature is that the domain of political elites has been based on the development of a political logic that needs a controlled selection process. Membership then requires a particular profile given by the social position of the subject (family background, higher education and training in private schools) and skills such as flexibility, adaptability, able to deal with risk. Added to the logic of desirable attributes, it is necessary to include features such as critical rationality, independence, competition (in a hierarchical model that requires members to win always), rigor, and strength (Moreno, 2001, p. 42). But how these patterns are linked to gendered recruitment criteria that may be limiting women's access to politics? All these conditions are socially recognised or attributed to men. While women have been slowly but gradually increasing their participation in political elites, they have been characterised as subjects belonging to a particular space and exerting limited and stereotypical representation.

As mentioned before, institutions are the rules that structure political and social life. In this case, informal institutions structure behaviour in a way that the political elites reinforce masculine standards. These gendered informal rules help continuing the masculinisation of the political elites, by allowing and promoting men within the executive branch. Two informal institutionalised practices and attitudes stood out during the interviews, as all women interviewed mentioned them, some in more depth than others. These include (1) unspoken entry restrictions based on desirable features people were expected to hold; and (2) gendered stereotypes (e.g. motherhood child upbringing and marriage). Ten of the third-teen undersecretaries interviewed provided depth details of their own experiences and how the gender roles have affected their job performance. One of the Secretaries explicitly identified gender roles as an important aspect limiting the advancement of women who worked with her. Five of the undersecretaries, or 38%, expressed explicitly that at some point in their politics careers they had been discriminated for being women but also for not contributing as men to their parties or organisations. The rest, although did not use the word discrimination, mentioned they have experienced or observed such practices. Although unspoken restrictions and gender stereotypes do not constitute an exhaustive or comprehensive recount of all informal practices that may impede women's promotion within the executive branch, they were the two constantly repeated or brought forward by all respondents. Because of this reason, these two are addressed.

Regarding desirable features people were expected to hold, although the structure of politics is slowly changing, it is still based on groups and charismatic leaders. The modifications observed in networks are partly the result of the democratisation process. The reforms to the system were directly related to changes in electoral competitiveness. However, they have yet to influence the existence and continuity of patriarchal relations. The patriarchal construction of these networks has created, as Secretary 1 calls them, "*entry restrictions for people with different ideas or features to those of its members*" (Secretary 1. Mexico City, Mexico. 26 May, 2015). This, as she suggested, includes women. Although women within the executive branch come from privileged backgrounds, especially in terms of class and education, as evidence shows, this does not fully identify them as members of the political elites.<sup>2</sup>

Requirements such as education, family connections and networks seem to be insufficient. Even if these are met, some other "necessary" features to become totally included will may never be satisfied as these are characteristics that are attributed only to men. All interviewees recognised that there is an implicit notion that members or politicians need to uphold certain profile, and that among these identity characteristics, gender is a really important one. As Undersecretary 2 stressed, "*these networks that men have created are for men ... these usually involve low participation of women*" (Undersecretary 2. Mexico City, Mexico. 15 July, 2015). According to Bourdieu (2000) the qualities or characteristics that are unique to humans are generally assigned on a fixed belief of binary opposites, in which human males and females are forced to adjust their behaviour and identity to these parameters or stereotypes (Bourdieu, 2000). When considering that masculinity is associated with strength, rationality and hardness (among other things), then the feminine side seems to be

represented with weakness, emotion and softness. If these considerations are accepted or taken as given within a society, then what has followed is that politics is associated to men and the household to women.

In light of the before mentioned rationality, gender-based stereotypes are likely to alter perceptions and modify behaviour. This brings us to what was previously identified with the second aspect of informality that limits women in their entry and advancement within the Mexican executive branch. All interviewees recognised that both men and women require certain characteristics to have better opportunities to ascend within the government structure. The description of political elites as empowered through connections, wealth and family ties applies to both. However, “*men tend to favour men*” (Undersecretary 7. Mexico City, Mexico. 28 May, 2014) as an unequal appraisal of individual members ensure both presence and control by men. But on what grounds this unequal assessment is made? According to respondents, gendered stereotypes create responsibilities for women, including childbearing and home maintenance, meaning there are preconceptions of what women’s time should be or is expected to be spend on. Gendered stereotypes then give ground for women not to be equally perceived as men.

For example, all the interviewees agreed that informal rules establishing the desirable profile for membership meant accepting odd working hours. Undersecretary 5 explains:

Part of what makes it difficult to have more women in high ranking positions is that in Mexico we still have a work culture where there is no respect for the schedules and working hours ... what makes a big difference is that there comes a time when you have to make many sacrifices, and for many women it is very difficult, for example stay in the office until ten thirty or eleven at night, it is very difficult when you have children, when your husband or partner does not accept this ... (Undersecretary 5. Mexico City, Mexico. 24 June, 2014)

In the Mexican patriarchal culture, “gender bias has promoted an ideology that glorifies the role of women as child bearers, as a determinant of female identity” (DiGirolamo & Salgado de Snyder, 2008, p. 516). One of three Secretaries and ten of the thirteen Undersecretaries explicitly affirmed that at some point in their careers, but more specifically when they held low or mid ranked positions, they were treated differently than men as they were seen as responsible for their children and their home. All women interviewed acknowledged that members of the administration sometimes perceived women as less committed because of their primary activities as caregivers and home keepers. However, only one Secretary and ten undersecretaries confirmed they had been discriminated at some point in their careers because they were women. The other five acknowledge that women working for them were experiencing difficulties in performing as men because they were responsible for their children. In one way or another, either because of self-experience or colleagues experiences, they all asserted that women are assigned fewer responsibilities. For women gender stereotypes are detrimental to their careers since their abilities are questioned. Undersecretary 7 expressed that:

I think the natural barrier is the issue of motherhood and the role played by mothers in our society, in their relationship with their children and their education ... thinking of the women who come to work with me, I see them as capable as men and as committed as men, except when the process of motherhood starts, because moms are expected to be with young children who are two months old or moms need to feed a child who is six months or have to be aware of children age six at school and I think in that sense, that it is not a constraint but an additional challenge that is imposed or self-imposed to women in our society. (Undersecretary 7. Mexico City, Mexico. 28 May, 2014)

The masculine stereotype depicts men as tough, aggressive, forceful, dominant, risk-takers, able to endure pressure. On the other hand, the feminine stereotype has depicted women as emotional, kind, compassionate, and warm, concern for the welfare of others (Eagly & Crowley, 1986; Eagly & Steffen, 1986). As Secretary 3 stressed,

in the workplace and even with co-workers younger than I, there is little respect for women, professionally, as if you are a man then you are more capable or if you are a woman and you are not in favour of something or have firm positions then you have bad character or you are unstable, there are still a lot of stereotypes and that is complicated. (Secretary 3. Mexico City, Mexico. 4 March, 2015)

For Undersecretary 1, it was marriage. When she was expecting a promotion she explains, she was told she would not get it because “*you’ll probably get married*” (Undersecretary 1. Mexico City, Mexico. 11 November, 2014).

The direct effect of these stereotypes is seen in the organisational chart within the Secretaries. Women are perceived to be incapable of taking responsibility for what are seen as “typically male areas”, such as finance, energy, economic development, climate change, foreign affairs, defence, trade and infrastructure. A total absence of women in senior positions is observed in the Secretary of Defence and the Navy. On the other hand, there are more women in senior positions within the Secretary of Agrarian, Urban and Territorial Development than anywhere else. On average, 21% of the senior members are women (own calculations based on *Presidencia*, n.d., online). The percentage of women in high-ranking positions is between twenty and 30% in the Secretaries of the Interior, Finance, Energy, Economy, Health and Public Administration. In other Secretaries the percentage of women varies between ten and 14% women (own calculations based on *Presidencia*, n.d., online).

In some cases, even, the stereotypes arranging the selection process by elites members have become a way for excluding women. Mainly, because women have demonstrated their ability not only to be good at their jobs, but also that they are equally ambitious, risk takers, dominant and even aggressive as men. All interviewees stressed fear of women and their capabilities. Stereotypes depict women as fragile, however, when working they tend to show their willingness and commitment, making them “targets of jealousy among peers, or even office leaders”. As Secretary 3 recalls,

Before getting into the executive branch, an Ambassador asked me to go abroad with him, but then he became nervous because he thought I was going to overshadow his work, and I ended up locked in my office without attending meetings or negotiations, only looking into files ... (Secretary 3. Mexico City, Mexico. 4 March, 2015)

The system of ideas by which men and women are differentiated based on gender traits subsists and sometimes even overlaps with the interests of elites. In this case, it overlaps with the contingent that elite members are supposed to have a certain profile and accomplish objectives within aggressive environments. Competition, time demanding and risk management are intertwined with basic elite characteristics, such as private university degrees, wealth or family connections. Thus, sometimes women can sneak in, mainly because they are highly educated, and in some cases, wealthy and with strong political family roots. As Undersecretary 6 recalls, “*I think I got invited to the Secretary because of two reasons, one because I have a Ph.D. and that has always opened doors for me, the other is that I am a member of the foreign service*” (Undersecretary 6. Mexico City, Mexico. 12 September, 2013). But sometimes, this invitation is given because of the political support they hold, because a patronage systems is working in promoting their careers.

Thus, informal practices involve patronage among elite groups, including sponsoring and promoting certain women into key positions. But, exactly how patronage and clientelism work together in promoting women and at the same time, continue reproducing gendered elite power relations? The following section attempts to shed light into this aspect.

## **6. The patronage system and its interactions with gendered stereotypes**

In all sectors, including the executive Mexican branch, a patronage system works supported and encouraged by privilege sectors. Patronage, based on a reciprocal relation, implies the use of someone’s influence to assist or protect another person or group. In literature, patronage has either been identified as influence (Boissevain, 1966), as political allegiance (Campbell, 1964) or as benefits

(Mayer, 1966). Patronage “refers to the ways in which party politicians distribute public jobs or special favors in exchange for electoral support” (Weingrod, 1968, p. 379). It is about politically mediated access, to office, to resources, to mass media, to political capital. It is even capable of buffering discrimination.

Patronage, is thus characterised by the distribution of public employment, either in order to gain support in a specific community or, the exclusive inclusion in the bureaucracy. This with the aim of exercising restricted domain of public power in support of elite’s political control. Patronage is a display of loyalty and involves the private appropriation of public goods. Clientelism implies the existence of patronage. In order to guide the direction of the decision-making process for the benefit of special interests, relationships of hierarchy and loyalty are required. In this case, between members of the same organisation, the executive branch.

The conceptualisation and creation of Mexican political organisations requires specific practices, including the imposition of hierarchies, the allocation of responsibilities based on to the assessment of individuals, and pork barrel practices. Men and women are participants in these arrangements. They both are clients and patrons. However, women and men do not experience the phenomenon of patronage the same way. Gendered patterns cut across the implicit hierarchical and exclusion features of patronage. “Gender is implicated in the fundamental, ongoing process of creating and conceptualizing social structures ... it helps to frame the underlying relations of other structures, including complex organisations” (Acker, 1990, p. 147).

But how exactly are gendered patterns intertwined with patronage? Patronage is dependent on the assessment made about a person, their attributes, capacities and resources (financial, family, media, etc.). Based on this assessment, resources, responsibilities, and the hierarchical position of a person are determined. Patterns of exclusion, which constitute the core of patronage, are based on socially predefined gender roles.

Informal institutions have allowed elite groups to work in a gender manner, situation that is common and accepted. Gender assigned roles, as research suggests, have worked alongside these institutions, influencing decisions and behaviour. Gender roles have had consequences on the relationships women have with their peers, subordinates, and even superiors. For example, some men may not want women within their groups because they view women as mothers, daughters, and spouses rather than peers or potential allies (Cook, 1979; Mott and Shapiro, 1978). Either women are considered to be unprepared for leadership or when a woman is proficient in a leadership position, it is often rejected since her behaviour defies prescriptive beliefs of what is desirable behaviour among females.

Stereotypes constitute the undeniable and even unknown base from which decisions are made and where patronage is rooted. Gender misconceptions of what is expected constitute part of the understanding held by those who lead. This selective approach based on “desire” qualities, and connected to stereotypes, constitute the basis for exclusion (e.g. Eby, McManus, Simon, & Russell, 2000; Scandura, 1998). As Undersecretary 9 recalls:

It was a shock when he (the president of the Foreign Service at that time) offered me to go out of Mexico and with a certain position ... but when the official post was actually offered he told me I was going as an Advisor but with the wage of a First Secretary. He told me I was single with no family to support, and so I was supposed to go that way or not at all. (Undersecretary 9. Mexico City, Mexico. 7 August, 2015)

While acknowledging that the more they advanced in the hierarchy, negative effects due to gender roles were no longer present, women interviewed recognise that the weight of customs and practices in women working around them but lower in the hierarchy, is evident. Although many of the interviewees acknowledged that they were in privileged positions, like the fact they are highly educated women or have families with good political positions or wealth, they also recognised that

institutional practices have worked so that they are not peers among peers, let alone subordinates equally capable.

Patronage itself is grounded on gender-based responsibilities in which women are subjects of the private domain (home) and men tough enough to work in public spaces. As pointed out by interviewees, for women it involves sacrifices, including family and personal time. Furthermore, women may not be seen as suitable leaders themselves, as gendered stereotypes embedded within the system portrait women with fewer traits and motivations allegedly necessary to attain and achieve success in high-level political positions.

The system itself, out of context, does not seem to be masculinised, as it involves decision-making, networking, and working spaces. However, it cannot be taken out of context, where a number of determinants have already been masculinised and operate under continuing gender stereotypes and socially defined roles. It is in this world where patronage ultimately constrains women in their advancement into high-level positions in the Mexican executive branch. But how exactly patronage manifest itself with regard to women's careers?

In the case of the Mexican executive branch, access to high ranking positions is not done through elections but by appointment. This has led to the continued use of arbitrary exclusionary practices that are based on personal relationships. The nomination of high ranking members for the advancement of one's career is performed by leading figures that exert significant influence. Specifically, *apadrinaje* and *camarillas*, as forms of socialisation work as generators of spaces for promoting a political career and as mechanisms through which an individual is put in contact with influential people.

*Apadrinaje* (literally means being a godfather) and *camarillas* are fundamental institutions that tie together Mexican political structures. *Padrinos*, as conceptualised by Castellanos, is a type of social relationship based on a religious dogma under which the sponsor is committed to caring for the children (Castellanos, 1969). In Mexican political relations it has been used "as a reference for the socialization of political elites, to the extent that they have become accustomed or socialized to the idea that through it they can get various services or favors" (Nieto, 2011, p. 173). *Camarilla*, or political cliques as Camp defines them (1990) have been "an integral element in Mexican politics since the 19th century ... can be accurately characterized as the cement of the Mexican political system" (Camp, 1990, p. 85). *Camarillas* understood as political clique, and as a set of practices that encourage friendship relations, while *padrinos* are key figures, leading members of elite groups responsible for nourishing and promoting people's careers. These *camarillas* are central to the functioning of the system, as they help determining who rises at the top of the political system. *Camarillas* and *padrino* figures work as elements of political recognition but also involve generic practices that guarantee (or taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women. These *padrinos*, as Undersecretary 13 stress, "form a special club of male politicians ... a *club de tobá*" (Undersecretary 13. Mexico City, Mexico. 29 July, 2014).

Both *camarillas* and *padrinos* are gendered patterns for political socialisation. They help conceptualising and reproducing gendered political structures. On political socialisation, it is important to stress that to some extent, it provides a basic reference regarding political relations, values and behavioural patterns, allowing members of a political group to acquire guidance for the exercise of political power. The process of political socialisation is proper to each culture and each political system. In some democratic societies, learning and exercising political power is done under competitive models of efficiency, professional attributes, experience, and commitment to society. Others, however, favoured a logic of political socialisation based on personal relationships, commitments. Thus, professional efficiency is replaced by loyalty and complicity with superiors, families, friends and in the case of the Mexican executive branch, with *padrinos* and *camarillas*.

Both are key figures helping to distribute power within a system that is based on the exchange for loyalty and future expectations. The latter, as described directly by eight of the interviewees, do not

refer to a single incentive, but to take part in a broader context of reciprocal loyalties. These exchanges and incentives may entail tangible goods and services, such as future jobs within someone's team (i.e. a cabinet position), access to media, or financial resources but also favours (i.e. discretionary decisions in government's tenders), preferential access, information, discipline and silence. Instead of exchanging political rights for social benefits (Fox, 1994), as its done between voters (clients) and patrons (electable politicians), it is among politicians. This relation is also characterised by an unequal share of power.

For Bobbio and Bovero, political socialisation refers to the political processes by which members of a society learn certain principles, values, norms and behavioural patterns (Bobbio & Bovero, 1984, pp. 1567–1569). Members of the Mexican political elite have learn through some *padrinos* or *camarillas*, “that women are not well suited for politics” (Undersecretary 4. Mexico City, Mexico. 7 October, 2013). Women interviewed acknowledged they were partially guided, trained or advice into the principles and values of behaviour expected in the executive branch. In some instances, they had to deal with some *padrinos* and *camarillas* that did not see women fitted for office, because women “will be, at some point, responsible for their families” (Undersecretary 6. Mexico City, Mexico. 12 September, 2013). *Padrinos* and *camarillas* relations promote intentionally, a political socialisation in the executive, and with this, the internalisation of political roles (Murillo, 1990, p. 27). In some cases, gendered political roles.

Patronage, through personal relations structured by gender, promotes political careers, stimulating gains in status, and entry into an exclusive group. Personal relations in the form of *padrinos* and *camarillas*, enhance career success because they produce exposure and visibility. Different leaders will have quite different access to and experience within networks. Thus, it becomes significant to be recruited into a prominent political network with a sufficient and broad clientelist base. Furthermore, for women, success may be achieved because of these networks. In concomitance with what interviewees have stressed, Victoria Rodriguez found that “the most successful political women have been *camarilla* members” (2003, p. 168). As mentioned above, the Mexican political culture places a lot of stress in the need of accumulating friends. According to Undersecretary 11, this is interchangeable with the accumulation of power and influence. If the goal is upward mobility, *camarillas* or “friendship relations” based on patronage-clientelist networks have proven to be fostering this mobility.

As Undersecretary 2 highlights,

I feel the opportunities I have had in life have been given to me by the people I have met and not the institution ... the first time I worked within the Secretary for Energy was because of a direct invitation of the Secretary (a man) at the time and it was a very interesting experience, because I was invited to lead the international Department. (Undersecretary 2. Mexico City, Mexico. 15 July, 2015)

Women are seen as outsiders, not all networks and politicians have been willing to accept women as insiders. Specifically, as five of the Undersecretaries and two Secretaries pointed out explicitly, men have not wanted women as part of the networks because of widely held stereotypes, which “impede” women to share the secrecy, practice codes, expected load of work or even being reciprocal in terms of future expectations, all necessary to belong. As Secretary 2 recalls, “belonging to a group with a leader who accepts the presence of women can open different doors, but a man thinking women belong to their homes can definitively close others” (Secretary 2. Mexico City, Mexico. 20 January, 2014). For her, it meant not having problems as a legislative representative, since her group leader was supportive of women. However, within the executive branch, it meant staying out of meetings that were “not deem appropriate for me to attend” (Secretary 2. Mexico City, Mexico. 20 January, 2014).

But how patronage, through gendered patterns (Acker, 1992) of political socialisation, are specifically isolating women? Men dominate political organisations, in this case the executive branch. Beyond the composition of the presidential cabinet, as of August 2015, of the fifty-one available

undersecretary positions, women hold only 9.6% while men preside over 83% of the secretaries and 18% of the registry offices. If these high-ranking positions are to be classified as elite positions (previous research has done this classification, see Camp, 1989; Smith, 1979), it is fair to conclude that men mainly compose elite groups. As eight of the undersecretaries' explicitly stressed, they hold control at the top because they take decisions regarding recruitment, which is monitored carefully in order to protect the network from "intruders". Those in the upper echelons reinforce discipline. This is the case of charismatic male figures, depicted as such by the interviewees, figures working with the system and advancing informality as means for controlling recruitment. As Bjarnegård & Zetterberg conclude, "informal institutions and relationships are generally less open to newcomers and disadvantaged groups in the political arena" (Bjarnegård & Zetterberg, 2011, p. 190). In the Mexican executive branch this includes women. Power tends to be transmitted to someone who is usually part of male-dominated networks, thus preserving the power of those who already have input.

Patronage is about mediated access, is about gate keeping so desirable profiles are the ones that are let through. The decisions that allow access imply hierarchical exclusion. Choices or judgements about who is best fitted are gendered based. As argued, patronage is dependent on the assessment made about a person. Appraisal is based on socially predefined gender roles. Thus, patronage is embedded in gendered misconceptions. At the same time, patronage manifest itself through personal relationships, *camarillas* and *padrinos*, that latter keep promoting gendered patterns (based on Acker concept, 1992) within political socialisation. It is a vicious circle, one in which masculine patronage prevails because personal relations promoting political socialisation continue entrenching gender misconceptions of both, desirable profiles for political office and, politics itself. Patronage in the Mexican executive branch is not buffering discrimination not because it cannot, but because patronage itself has been originally crafted as a male dominated practice.

### 7. Final remarks

"Good stereotypes" for political office, understood as generalised and socially shared rules about the traits of political leadership, have been attributed to male figures. Both men and women politicians experience the consequences of the patronage system. However, because of a combination of institutionalised but informally based stereotypes underpinning personal relations that tight together the Mexican political system, women's political careers are limited to mid-level positions. Few have managed to go higher in the hierarchy. Moreover, stereotypes in combination with other informal rules such as political patronage and personal connections, have created the idea that women require special guidance and protection. This in order to facilitate entry into the political arena and a rapid ascend in politics.

Based on the above, it is possible to conclude with two key ideas. Firstly, traditional gender role expectations have encouraged men to take leading roles and women to lag behind, at least when gendered traits such as motherhood or marriage demands so. Five of the interviewees explicitly stressed that men are reluctant to allow women in because they feel they are not as committed or do not have the necessary time, meaning patronage would not result in mutual gains. Secondly, networks are already controlled and filled by men. Men are *padrinos* and men lead *camarilla* relations. Few women have had formal and informal opportunities. Women lack access to resources, to political sponsors, but mainly, wish to endeavour in a profession, which according to gender based patterns nourishing patronage and clientelism, is not for women.

The consequence of the above mentioned points is that women face additional difficulties to those faced by men. Even if both are subjects of the patronage system, where politicians are expected to behave as much as clients or patrons, the combination of this system with gendered patterns of exclusion (Acker, 1992) has resulted in fewer women moving up. Even if a patronage system is condoned, it has to work in a gender-neutral manner, where the desire to involve and promote someone is based on his or her characteristics and abilities, and not on stereotypes or socially decided conventions. Although this may take time, for now it is important to keep pushing and challenging the patriarchal relations of domination working hand in hand with gendered stereotypes,

defining who can and cannot belong to the political elite. This mainly because when a woman reaches a high ranking position in the world of politics, her biography comes to be relevant. It alters interpretations of life experiences and myths that shape the social definition of the functions assigned to her sex. It changes how personal attributes are seen as part of her abilities to hold office and be successful doing so.

Theoretically speaking, this research has contributed to feminist institutionalism because it has studied political institutions, how they are formed and how gender is embedded in them. This research offers a systematic effort to present and evaluate institutional designs through a gender lens. A significant part of the contribution to feminist institutionalism lies in the analysis of political recruitment, policy-making, the significance of personal relations for state formation, and the employment of informal institutions to reduce women's own expectations of participating in high ranking positions within the executive branch.

Given the relevance of gender stereotypes in the definition and crafting of core political practices such as recruitment, selection and appointment of individuals into the executive branch, connecting feminist and main stream institutionalism is key for understanding issues of power and submissive relations. Additionally, this research has brought, through a gendered approach to institutions and power, significant insights to the study of women in the Mexican executive branch. This particular area of research, in light of recent events on parity within the legislative, has been neglected. Thus, this article offers a new approach to the study of women's presence in Mexican politics. It establishes an exploratory foundation for far-reaching feminist institutionalist research agenda of power relations.

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#### Notes

1. For doing so, he created three separate office holding cohorts. Individuals in the late Diaz regimes were grouped and pre-revolutionary; those who held office between 1917 and 1940 constituted the revolutionary group; and those who made an appearance between 1946 and 1971 comprised the post revolutionary cohort.
2. All women interviewed had Bachelor degrees in Law, International Relations and Economics; sixty-three percent attended private Universities.
3. In Latin American culture, reunions where no women attend are called "Club de Tobi". The phrase comes from a children's story, the tales *La Pequeña Lulu*. In the story a character named Tobi has a small hut in his parents' garden where he meets his friends to play. Outside there is a sign stating "No girls allowed", since the character considers them his worst enemy.

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## Appendix

Because few women are part of the Executive branch, and in order to secure anonymity, it is not possible to specify the positions for each of the interviewees. In doing so, and by providing the date of the interview, it would be possible to infer the name of the person. The reason for this is that the women interviewed, in many cases, were the only ones in that position in the entire Secretariat during the period when the interview took place. This is the case for both the undersecretaries and the secretaries interviewed. However, it can be said that the respondents came from the following offices: Secretary of Energy; Secretary of Agricultural, Territorial and Urban Development; Secretary of Foreign Relations; The Federal Treasury; Secretary of Finance and Public Credit; Secretary of Public Education; Secretary of Public Health; Secretary of Tourism; Secretary of the Interior; and the Secretary of Economy.

The interviews were conducted in the following dates and places:

Undersecretary 1. Mexico City, Mexico. 11 November, 2014.

Undersecretary 2. Mexico City, Mexico. 15 July, 2015.

Undersecretary 3. Mexico City, Mexico. 2 June, 2014.

Undersecretary 4. Mexico City, Mexico. 7 October, 2013.

Undersecretary 5. Mexico City, Mexico. 24 June, 2014.

Undersecretary 6. Mexico City, Mexico. 12 September, 2013.

Undersecretary 7. Mexico City, Mexico. 28 May, 2014.

Undersecretary 8. Mexico City, Mexico. 15 May, 2014.

Undersecretary 9. Mexico City, Mexico. 7 August, 2015.

Undersecretary 10. Mexico City, Mexico. 16 April, 2014.

Undersecretary 11. Mexico City, Mexico. 8 July, 2014.

Undersecretary 12. Mexico City, Mexico. 17 October, 2013.

Undersecretary 13. Mexico City, Mexico. 29 July, 2014.

Secretary 1. Mexico City, Mexico. 26 May, 2015.

Secretary 2. Mexico City, Mexico. 20 January, 2014.

Secretary 3. Mexico City, Mexico. 4 March, 2015.



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